Comparison · RedactSure Research
Chris Sowa · Founder, RedactSure
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RedactSure vs Cisco Cloudlock: 2026 Comparison & Alternative
Cisco Cloudlock uses APIs to manage cloud app risk, while RedactSure, a Cisco Cloudlock alternative built for AI agents, replaces values on the screen before any model reads it. RedactSure is an alternative way to think about agent browsing security, because it protects sensitive data as it is rendered on a screen, before an agent uses it.
A Cisco Cloudlock alternative for AI agent data protection comes down to what a model reads when an agent opens a customer record in a CRM the organization bought. Cloudlock watches cloud users, data and connected apps through reachable APIs, and acts on what they report (Cisco, Product page, 2026). The agent here never calls an API: it works the CRM screen as a representative does, and the model receives what the screen shows, which no API connection sees.
Three data sheets and a product page from Cisco describe a broker that reaches cloud apps through APIs. The customer record is in a cloud CRM, holding a name, an email address, a phone number, a billing address and an account note, opened by an agent that works the screen as a representative does. What Is Render-Layer Tokenization? defines the approach measured here, and Runtime Tokenization vs DLP for AI Agents sets out why substitution and detection differ.
Key findings
- As a Cisco Cloudlock alternative for agent work, RedactSure replaces the values on the rendered CRM page before any model reads it, so the agent works with CUST_001 and EMAIL_001 while the customer's real details stay out of the model (What Is Render-Layer Tokenization?).
- Data a model receives is an exposure wherever the record lives, and OWASP lists "Personal identifiable information (PII) may be disclosed during interactions with the LLM" among the risks that "can result in unauthorized data access, privacy violations, and intellectual property breaches" (OWASP, LLM02, 2025).
- The record a buyer needs is a record of what the model read: every screen as tokens, every action and approval, exported to the customer's SIEM (What Is an AI Control Record?).
- Cloudlock is "a cloud-native cloud access security broker (CASB)" whose approach "uses APIs to manage the risks in your cloud app ecosystem," which places the control in the connected application rather than on the screen (Cisco, Product page, 2026).
- Its user security sheet says Cloudlock "detects activity indicative of account compromise by correlating and analyzing usage information across SaaS, IaaS, PaaS, and IDaaS environments to identify anomalies" (Cisco, User Security, 2026).
- Cisco's Zero Trust for Agentic AI page describes agent identity and traffic controls, with "Inspect agentic traffic to understand intent," and it does not name Cloudlock (Cisco, Zero Trust, 2026).
How do the two compare side by side?
The table sets Cloudlock's wording beside what a governed environment does on the same point.
| Dimension | Cisco Cloudlock, per its pages | RedactSure | What to verify |
|---|---|---|---|
| Where the control sits | "uses APIs to manage the risks in your cloud app ecosystem" (Cisco, Product page, 2026) | On the screen the agent works in, before any model reads it | Where a value is replaced |
| How coverage starts | API connections to cloud apps, plus "data from firewalls and proxies" (Cisco, Apps Firewall, 2026) | The agent works inside the governed environment; the CRM is unchanged | How many applications are API-connected today |
| What the model receives | Not addressed; the page protects "your cloud users, data, and apps" (Cisco, Product page, 2026) | The CRM screen with tokens, CUST_001 and EMAIL_001, for the whole run | One screen as the model received it |
| How real values are restored | "requiring step-up authentication through integrations with IDaaS solutions" (Cisco, User Security, 2026) | Released at an approved destination when a named person approves the action | Who authorizes the release, and where it is recorded |
| Who approves an action | A policy and an analyst: alerts and step-up authentication run from the platform (Cisco, User Security, 2026) | A named person approves every payment, submission and record change | A person's name, not a rule |
| The audit record | "correlating and analyzing usage information across SaaS, IaaS, PaaS, and IDaaS environments" (Cisco, User Security, 2026) | Every screen as tokens, every action and approval, exported to the customer's SIEM | Whether the record shows what the model saw |
The two middle columns differ in the object each product governs. Cloudlock governs the cloud application and the account behind it, so its answer covers what the API exposes and the activity it reports. A governed environment governs what an agent reads, and its answer is one record of the page the model was given. Who restores a real value separates them further: a platform policy on Cloudlock's pages, a named person in the governed design (What Is Supervised Delegation?).
What does Cisco Cloudlock protect, and where does it act?
Cisco Cloudlock protects cloud users, data and applications, and its product page states the scope in one line: "It protects your cloud users, data, and apps" (Cisco, Product page, 2026). The page lists three features that follow that scope: user security, data loss prevention policies and an Apps Firewall for connected apps.
Every benefit depends on one condition: the cloud application is connected, so the broker can reach it through an API or read the logs it produces. The Apps Firewall data sheet draws on "data from firewalls and proxies, including Cisco ASA and Cisco Firepower," and the user security sheet correlates usage across SaaS, IaaS, PaaS and IDaaS (Cisco, Apps Firewall, 2026). Its assessment data sheet asks the question an analyst asks of that activity: "Are certain users downloading or deleting high volumes of data?" (Cisco, Automated Assessment, 2026). The data sheets carry a 2017 copyright line, so they are Cisco's published description, not a 2026 statement.
A CRM screen an agent reads is not one of those inputs. That is a limit on where the design acts, not a defect in it. Cloudlock shares that limit: of 86 AI security and data protection products reviewed, none describes handing an agent a token in place of the value a screen shows, on documentation read October 22 to 27, 2026 (How Many AI Security Products Control What an AI Agent Sees?).
What does an agent read when it opens a customer record?
Consider the customer record in the cloud CRM. The agent opens it the way a service representative does, and the model receives the page as rendered: the name, email address, phone number, billing address and account note, along with every field the task did not need (Does an AI Agent See Everything on Your Screen?).
The CRM was bought rather than built, and the connection to Cloudlock carries the records its API exposes, not the pixels the model reads; the pages reviewed describe no control over a rendered screen (Cisco, Product page, 2026). The exposure then sits in the model: OWASP states that "Personal identifiable information (PII) may be disclosed during interactions with the LLM," and what a model has read stays in its context for the rest of the run (OWASP, LLM02, 2025). There is an identity gap as well: if the agent works under the representative's session, the CRM logs the representative, and nothing separates the agent's reads from the person's work, as Does Least Privilege Cover What an AI Agent Sees? sets out.
Which control fits which work?
Keep Cisco Cloudlock for
- Cloud visibility and behavior analytics across SaaS, IaaS, PaaS and IDaaS environments (Cisco, User Security, 2026).
- Connected-app control, with "capabilities to revoke risky applications based on their permission set and risk level" (Cisco, Apps Firewall, 2026).
- Compliance evidence for cloud adoption: "The authority to operate helps you enable secure cloud adoption across multiple platforms" (Cisco, Product page, 2026).
Add RedactSure for
- Agents reading screens in applications the organization bought, where the model receives CUST_001 instead of the customer's name (What Is Render-Layer Tokenization?).
- A named person who approves every payment, submission and record change before it lands (What Is Supervised Delegation?).
- The record of what the model received on every screen, in the customer's SIEM (What Is an AI Control Record?).
A company running agents on bought applications will usually keep both; the split is which protects the screen.
How do you test it on one workflow?
Run the comparison on one real workflow in an afternoon, with both vendors present and the answers written down.
Step 1. Choose a task the agent will run in the CRM, such as updating a billing address, and pick the screen it opens, the customer record.
Step 2. Ask each vendor to show that record exactly as the model received it. If the phone number and account note are legible in the output, the model read them, whatever the platform reported afterward.
Step 3. List every application in the workflow and mark each as connected to a cloud app API, covered by a data loss prevention policy, or neither. The last group is the first-day exposure, counted internally rather than by the vendor.
Step 4. Trace one value, the billing address, from the screen back to the real text: what released it, at which destination, and whose name is in the record. A platform that fires an alert has recorded a policy event, not an approval.
Step 5. Calculate coverage. If the task touches five applications and two are connected by API, first-day coverage is two of five. Compare the two costs that differ: integration work per application, and the agent work that waits, and put both numbers beside the first-day count before either vendor quotes a scope.
What does a governed environment change?
A governed environment is a class of control rather than a product feature. The agent works under its own session and identity, and it sees a different screen from the representative because values are replaced with consistent tokens before the model reads anything. The customer appears as CUST_001, with EMAIL_001, TEL_001 and ADDR_001 on every screen of the run, and the name and phone number in the account note render as CUST_001 and TEL_001. Real values resolve only at approved destinations at the moment of an approved action, a named person approves every payment, submission and record change, and every screen, action and approval goes to a control record exported to the SIEM.
Research explains why the control sits in front of the model. OWASP notes that "Indirect prompt injections occur when an LLM accepts input from external sources, such as websites or files," and a CRM's account note is such an input (OWASP, LLM01, 2025). The Springer paper on agentic risk argues that these systems' "architectural complexity, autonomous decision-making abilities, adaptive behaviors" and their tool use "introduce new and poorly understood security risks" (Springer, 2026). A model that only ever received CUST_001 cannot be manipulated into disclosing a name it never held, the principle in What Is Least Exposure?.
What the record shows
On the CRM page, tokens replace the customer's name, email address, phone number, billing address and the name and phone number in the account note before the model reads it, and the real values appear only for an approved action, with the approval carrying a name and a record that separates the agent's read from the representative's, exported to the customer's SIEM. Cisco Cloudlock covers the cloud application and the account behind it, reached by API, with activity analytics and an Apps Firewall for connected apps; its pages describe no control over what a model reads on a bought application's screen. Set one billing address change side by side as the test, and check which record names the person who released the value.
Methodology and limitations
This page draws on the Cisco Cloudlock product page, three Cloudlock data sheets, Cisco's Zero Trust for Agentic AI page, two OWASP entries, one peer-reviewed paper and RedactSure research pages. Sources were read between October 21, 2026 and October 23, 2026, and each Sources entry carries the date its page was read. Vendor statements are quoted in the vendor's own wording, and public documentation read in full gives a sound view of where each product applies its control; where this page says a source does not describe something, it refers to the pages reviewed.
The products on this page are described from documentation; neither was tested for this page, no customer of either is described, both change, and the page carries its date. RedactSure is deploying now with enterprise and government customers. The customer record is an illustrative type, not an organization. Determinations rest with the organization's counsel, assessors and security officers, and nothing replaces a pilot of one workflow on the organization's own screens.
Frequently asked questions
Does Cisco Cloudlock protect data an agent sends to an LLM?
Only where the data crosses a connected cloud application's API. Cloudlock's pages describe a broker that protects "your cloud users, data, and apps" and uses APIs to manage cloud app risk, with analytics that read usage information from SaaS, IaaS, PaaS and IDaaS environments. An agent that opens a rendered CRM page sends nothing through that path, and the pages describe no inspection of what a model receives from a screen.
Does Cisco Cloudlock cover what an agent reads on a rendered screen?
Not from the pages reviewed. Cloudlock applies its control to cloud applications and the accounts behind them, through APIs and the activity those APIs report, and its remediation options are alerting, notification and step-up authentication. None of that changes the page the model receives, which shows the customer name, email address, phone number, billing address and account note as the CRM displays them.
Who approves the agent's action, a policy or a person?
A policy, on Cloudlock's pages. Its user security sheet says anomalies trigger "administrative alerting, end-user notification, and even requiring step-up authentication through integrations with IDaaS solutions," so the response is written in advance for a class of activity. Nothing in that sequence approves a specific record change the agent proposes; a named approver belongs to the workflow that submits the change, not to the broker watching the account.
What record exists of what the agent's model received?
An activity record, not a screen record. Cloudlock "detects activity indicative of account compromise by correlating and analyzing usage information across SaaS, IaaS, PaaS, and IDaaS environments," so its evidence is account behavior in connected systems. If the agent used the representative's session, the CRM logs the representative, and the model's own reading appears nowhere. A record of what the model saw has to come from the environment the agent read the page in.
Is Cisco Cloudlock the same as Cisco Zero Trust for Agentic AI?
No. They are separate Cisco products that address different layers. The Zero Trust for Agentic AI page covers agent identity and traffic, with a centralized agent directory and a promise to "Inspect agentic traffic to understand intent." That page does not name Cloudlock, and neither replaces values on a rendered page before a model reads it.
Does the Apps Firewall stop an agent from reading a customer record?
No. The Apps Firewall works on OAuth connected apps, with "capabilities to revoke risky applications based on their permission set and risk level," and it draws on firewall and proxy data. That governs which applications hold access to corporate data. It does not change what the CRM displays to an agent already signed in, so the record on the screen reaches the model unchanged.
How RedactSure closes the screen-level gap in API-based cloud app control
Cisco Cloudlock reaches cloud applications through their APIs, so a record an agent reads on a CRM screen never passes through its control. Its approach "uses APIs to manage the risks in your cloud app ecosystem," and a page is not an API response.
The environment that enforces this is built by RedactSure, an AI agent controls, governance and data protection company.
Before: the agent opens the CRM under the representative's session, the record shows the customer name, email address, phone number, billing address and account note, and the model receives all five. Inside: the same screen shows CUST_001, EMAIL_001, TEL_001, ADDR_001 and the name in the account note as CUST_001, and the real billing address reaches the CRM only when the named representative approves.
RedactSure is deploying now with enterprise and government customers.
Everyone else controls where data can go. RedactSure controls what the AI can see.
See it on your own workflow
Protecting the sensitive data an agent could read on a screen is a needed part of any solution that includes Cisco Cloudlock. Bring one CRM workflow and see, with test values, the record the model receives and the approval waiting. Book a demo