
Does Prompt Injection Expose Customer Records?
Yes, when the injected agent sees real customer data and can send outward; attacks leaked data at 20 to 70 percent. Check what the model holds.
Research topic
Research on lethal trifecta: AI agent security, tokenization and checks for sensitive data access before allowing enterprise workflows to run.

Yes, when the injected agent sees real customer data and can send outward; attacks leaked data at 20 to 70 percent. Check what the model holds.

Only partly. An allowlist controls where an agent goes, not what it reads on an approved page. Check what the model receives from each approved screen.

Not by breaking rules but by passing beneath them: DLP watches files and uploads while an agent reads the screen. Check what sees what the model received.

Only when the reading agent cannot also hold real sensitive data and act outward in one session, since any page may carry instructions. Check which it has.

An instruction a third party plants in content an agent reads, such as an email, file, web page or tool result, so the attacker never touches the prompt.

Three capabilities in one agent: private data, untrusted content and external communication, which turn a planted instruction into theft. Remove one.

The named person already accountable for releasing that data, such as the records custodian or account owner, not the AI team. Check each send goes there.

Because the model drifts, content it reads redirects it, and inherited permissions let it reach beyond the task. Check what each agent can see; fix that.